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INTRODUCTION
The world is everything that is the case. 
The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 
The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, Center for Health Law Studies, S.J.D., LL.M., 
Duke Law School. This essay has benefited from feedback received during presentations at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Schools Journal of Law and Innovation, the Health and Technology Policy 2020 Symposium at 
Gonzaga University School of Law, and at the Inoculating Against Misinformation on the Internet panel organized 
by the National Vaccine Advisory Committee in February 2020 in Washington DC.  
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For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case. 
The facts in logical space are the world. 
The world divides into facts. 
() 
What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) 
The history of science, like the history of all human ideas, is a history of irresponsible dreams, of 
obstinacy, and of error. But science is one of the very few human activities  perhaps the only one  in 
which errors are systematically criticized and fairly often, in time, corrected. This is why we can say that, 
in science, we often learn from our mistakes, and why we can speak clearly and sensibly about making 
progress there. 
Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (1963) 
Vaccine hesitancy  the reluctance or refusal to vaccinate despite the availability of vaccines  threatens 
to reverse progress made in tackling vaccine-preventable diseases. 
World Health Organization, Top Ten Threats to Global Health in 2019 (adding vaccine hesitancy 
to the list) 
The circulation of inaccurate information among national and transnational communities 
has been documented throughout history.1 A more recent development has been the use of online 
pathways to propagate inaccurate information on increasingly larger scales.2 The popularization 
of social media, in particular, has significantly accelerated and amplified the spread of 
misinformation.3 This growth has left virtually no field untouched, from discourses on political 
and electoral themes to climate change, finance and pop culture.4
1 See e.g. Robert Darnton, The True History of Fake News, N.Y. BOOK REV. (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/02/13/the-true-history-of-fake-news/ 
2 U.N. EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., JOURNALISM, FAKE NEWS & DISINFORMATION: HANDBOOK FOR JOURNALISM 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING (2018), at 17. 
3 See Michela Del Vicario et al., The Spreading of Misinformation Online, 113 PNAS 554 (2016). 
4 See generally CAILIN O'CONNOR & JAMES OWEN WEATHERALL, THE MISINFORMATION AGE (2018); Claire 
Wardle, Misinformation Has Created a New World Disorder, SCI. AM. (2019), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/misinformation-has-created-a-new-world-disorder/; Shimon Kogan et 
al., Fake News in Financial Markets (Nov. 11, 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237763; Kathie M. d'I. 
Treen et al., Online Misinformation About Climate Change, WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE (Jun. 18, 2020), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wcc.665 
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In recent years, levels of hesitancy towards vaccines have been increasing in many areas 
of the globe, especially among Western countries.5 The reasons for this increase are multi-factorial 
and not solely attributable to the growing circulation of misinformation specifically focused on 
vaccine-related themes.6 However, the accelerated and virtually unencumbered dissemination of 
vaccine misinformation in the online environmentand particularly through social mediahas 
profoundly reshaped this area.7 It has provided renewed visibility to vaccine-questioning and anti-
vaccine discourses; reoriented many of the efforts of anti-vaccine activists towards online and 
social media channels; and attracted the attention of a broader category of players, who seek to 
increase demand for, and monetize the purchase of, alternative health goods, and which now 
populate social media with anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning accounts.8
Vaccine misinformation has been exponentially exacerbated through use (and misuse) of 
the manifold avenues for the dissemination of content opened up by the popularization of social 
media.9 As seen in Part II, the online circulation of vaccine misinformation has now been linked 
to the growth of vaccine mistrust and hesitancy. Addressing the public health and technological 
paradox posed by insufficient uptake of available vaccines thus entails considering the ways in 
which vaccine misinformation propagates online; how this propagation has been instrumentalized 
by actors with certain ideological or monetization purposes, or both; and the policy and legal 
options available to curb the spread of vaccine misinformation.  
The Essay begins exploring these topics by explaining how the intertwined phenomena of 
vaccine trust and vaccine hesitancy are presently shaped by the recent spur in the circulation of 
inaccurate content about vaccines in mainstream social media. Part III provides a survey and 
taxonomy of recent and ongoing responses to vaccine misinformation from mainstream social 
media and online social networks. It further notes the limitations of current self-regulatory modes 
and illustrates these limitations by presenting a short case study on Facebookthe largest social 
5 See Peter Hotez, America and Europes New Normal: The Return of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 85 PEDIATRIC 
RES. 912 (2019). 
6 See generally Daniel A. Salmon et al., Vaccine Hesitancy: Causes, Consequences, and a Call to Action, 49 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. S391 (2015), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0749379715003141. 
7 See generally Andis Robeznieks, Stopping the Scourge of Social Media Misinformation on Vaccines, AM. MED.
ASSN (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/public-health/stopping-scourge-social-media-
misinformation-vaccines. 
8 See infra notes 148-149 and accompanying text. 
9 See e.g. Robeznieks, supra note 7. 
4
media vehicle for vaccine-specific misinformation, currently estimated to harbor approximately 
half of the social media accounts linked to vaccine misinformation. Part IV examines potential 
ways to improve stringency of ongoing modes of self-regulation of vaccine misinformation, as 
well as the creation of cooperative monitoring and mutual assistance networks dedicated to 
addressing issues specific to the field of vaccine misinformation. 
A framing note: while multiple definitions of these phenomena populate the literature,10
the term misinformation has come to be broadly understood as the dissemination of false or 
misleading content.11 A growing number of commentators treat the phenomenon of 
disinformation separately to reference situations in which such dissemination is done with the 
deliberate purpose of sowing doubt around a particular topic or increasing discord among holders 
of competing opinions or worldviews.12 The Essay uses the word misinformation as an umbrella 
term to denote the existence of inaccuracies in vaccine-related content, irrespective of intent. 
Throughout the Essay, the word disinformation is reserved for cases in which there is an intent 
to deceive in the dissemination of inaccurate vaccine-related content; and in which it references a 
source that adopts the word as an umbrella term itselfas is the case of the European Unions 
policy in this area.13
However, instead of adopting the umbrella expression anti-vaccine, the Essay 
distinguishes between instances of anti-vaccine discourses (statements that directly contradict 
current scientific consensus about the safety and efficacy of vaccines, or that promote vaccine 
refusal) and vaccine-questioning discourses (statements from individuals or organizations seeking 
more information about vaccines)14 in an effort to mirror the range of behaviors and motivations 
is this ideologically charged area. 
10 See e.g. Emily K. Vraga & Leticia Bode, Defining Misinformation and Understanding its Bounded Nature: Using 
Expertise and Evidence for Describing Misinformation, 37 POL. COMM. 136 (2020). 
11 Gordon Pennycook et al., Understanding and Reducing the Spread of Misinformation Online, PSYARXIV (2019), 
https://psyarxiv.com/3n9u8/ 
12 Claire Wardle & Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary Framework For 
Research And Policy Making, Council of Europe Report DGI(2017)09, at 16. 
13 See infra, Part IV.A. 
14 Such as individuals or organizations interrogating the safety of COVID-19 vaccines, which were developed 
according to a timeline perceived by the general public as exceptional.  
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I. A PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM: VACCINE MISINFORMATION, TRUST AND HESITANCY
A. A PUBLIC HEALTH PARADOX
Vaccines have long been regarded as one of the most cost-effective public health 
preparedness tools, playing an instrumental role in the prevention of outbreaks of infectious 
diseases, as well as in the response to ongoing outbreaks, as presently illustrated by the COVID-
19 pandemic. 
Outside the context of highly disruptiveand often suddenlarge-scale public health 
crises, robust administration of vaccines recommended by public health authorities not only 
improves public health outcomes, but also results in considerable savings to health systems, as 
well as in positive externalities for different economic sectors.15  Recent estimates from the World 
Health Organization indicate that vaccination prevents between two and three million deaths per 
year across the globe.16 A study analyzing vaccination practices in the United States found that 
vaccinating around 4 million infants helps prevent 42,000 early deaths and 20 million cases of 
illness.17 The study also calculated that avoidance of death and illness in this context would 
translate into US$13.5 billion savings in net direct costs,18 as well as US$68.8 billion in net savings 
in societal costs.19
While there are several vaccine-preventable diseases for which we currently lack 
commercially available vaccines,20 the number of vaccines targeting new diseases available to 
indicated populations has increased steadily from the mid-twentieth century onwards, leading to 
15 Vanessa Rémy et al., Vaccination: The Cornerstone of an Efficient Healthcare System, J. MRT. ACCESS 
HEALTH & POL'Y 27041 (2015). 
16 WORLD HEALTH ORG., Immunization coverage (2020), https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-
sheets/detail/immunization-coverage. 
17 Fangjun Zhou et al., Economic Evaluation of the Routine Childhood Immunization Program in the United States, 
2009, 133 Pediatrics 577 (2014), https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/133/4/577. 
18 Id., ib. This category encompasses the costs of medical treatment, as well as of non-medical interventions, such as 
the costs associated with special education services necessary for children suffering from disabilities. 
19 Id., ib. This category encomasses productivity losses and opportunity costs resulting from contracting a vaccine-
preventable disease or caring for children suffering from a vaccine-preventable disease. 
20 See Stanley A. Plotkin et al., Establishing a Global Vaccine-Development Fund, 373 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 297 
(2015). 
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the eradication or near-eradication of many devastating diseases, as well as to significant 
reductions in the burden of many others .21
In recent years, however, wavering trust in vaccines has been deemed one of the most 
significant contributing factors towards declining rates of vaccination, particularly across the 
Western world.22 Problems of trust related to health technologies, and in particular vaccines, are 
not new. Different communities have historically challenged the public health value, safety and 
efficacy of vaccines, even when presented with the best available scientific evidence supporting 
the use of a given vaccine, and of vaccines in general, as further described in Part II.23
Periods of heightened vaccine mistrust are linked to increased behavioral hesitancy 
affecting the timely administration of recommended vaccines to indicated patients.24 The World 
Health Organization currently defines vaccine hesitancy as the reluctance or refusal to 
vaccinate despite the availability of vaccines.25 In 2019, the World Health Organization added 
vaccine hesitancy to the list of the top ten threats to global health.26
We thus face a technological paradox with salient implications for public health and 
preparedness frameworks.27 Notwithstanding the broad availability of health technologies that can 
prevent or lessen the burden of vaccine-preventable diseases, mistrust and hesitancy towards these 
technologies hamper their deployment as tools of public health.28 As a result, vaccine-preventable 
21 See e.g. ARTHUR ALLEN, VACCINE: THE CONTROVERSIAL STORY OF MEDICINE'S GREATEST LIFESAVER 50 (2007); DAVID M. 
OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY (2006). See also Vaccines Licensed for Use in the United States, U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/vaccines/vaccines-licensed-use-united-states (listing 
currently licensed vaccines in the United States).
22 Walter A. Orenstein et al., Assessing the State of Vaccine Confidence in the United States: Recommendations from 
the National Vaccine Advisory Committee, 130 PUB. HEALTH REP. 573 (2015); Heather MacDougall & Laurence 
Monnais, Vaccinating in the Age of Apathy: Measles Vaccination in Canada 19631998, 190 CAN. J. MED. ASSN
E399 (2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5880649/; Heidi Larson et al., State of Vaccine 
Confidence in the European Union in 2018, 29 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 141 (2019). 
23 See e.g. Berman, infra note 37. 
24 See e.g. Eve Dubé et al., Vaccine Hesitancy, Vaccine Refusal and the Anti-Vaccine Movement: Influence, Impact 
and Implications, 14 EXP. REV. VACCINES 99 (2015). 
25 WORLD HEALTH ORG., TEN THREATS TO GLOBAL HEALTH IN 2019 (2019), https://www.who.int/news-
room/feature-stories/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019. 
26 Id., ib.
27 See CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Capabilities: National Standards for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Public Health (2021), 
https://www.cdc.gov/cpr/readiness/capabilities.htm (defining preparedness as the ability of communities to prepare 
for, withstand, and recover from public health incidents in both the short and long term). 
28 See e.g. Denis G. Gill, Vaccine Refusal and the Risks of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 360 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 
1981 (2009). 
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diseases for which a vaccine is available are making a comeback. The 2019 outbreaks of measles 
across the United States, for example, have been directly linked to growing hesitancy towards 
childhood vaccines that have been recommended by public health authorities, commercialized and 
administered for decades.29
During the COVID-19 pandemic, public health authorities in the United States have had to 
contend with sub-optimal levels of public trust in newly developed vaccines, a phenomenon that 
continues to cast doubts on whether ongoing vaccine manufacturing and vaccination efforts will 
be enough to reach the critical mass required to achieve herd immunity within projected 
timelines.30 This provides a stark contrast with the vaccine trust environment that characterized 
earlier vaccine races. The strong vaccine uptake that followed the development and approval of 
the first polio vaccines in the mid-1950s set in motion a series of public health initiatives that 
ultimately resulted in a 99% reduction of the incidence of the disease worldwide.31 By contrast, 
there were signs early on in the COVID-19 pandemic that a significant number of potentially 
indicated vaccine recipients were hesitant about receiving the vaccines, or planned to skip COVID-
19 vaccination altogether.32 For instance, less than three months after the World Health 
Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic, only around 50% of Americans indicated that they 
were planning on receiving the vaccine, if one were to be made available during the pandemic.33
The intertwined problems of vaccine trust and vaccine hesitancy at the root of the 
resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseasesor protracted duration of outbreaks of new 
diseasescannot be attributed to a single factor.34 Some of these factors have deep historical and 
29 See David A. Broniatowski et al., Facebook Pages, the Disneyland Measles Outbreak, and Promotion of 
Vaccine Refusal as a Civil Right, 20092019, 110 AM. J PUB. HEALTH S312 (2020). 
30 See e.g. Alex Kacik, Half of Americans are 'highly likely' to get COVID-19 Vaccinations, MODERN HEALTH CARE
(Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/safety/half-americans-are-highly-likely-get-covid-19-
vaccinations. See also Lauran Neergaard & Hannah Fingerhut, AP-NORC Poll: Only Half in US Want Shots as 
Vaccine Nears, ASSD PRESS (Dec. 9, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ap-norc-poll-us-half-want-vaccine-shots-
4d98dbfc0a64d60d52ac84c3065dac55 
31 WORLD HEALTH ORG., 10 FACTS ON POLIO ERADICATION (2017), https://www.who.int/features/factfiles/polio/en/. 
32 See e.g. Emily A. Harrison & Julia W. Wu, Vaccine Confidence in the Time of COVID-19, 22 EUR. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1 (2020). 
33 Warren Cornwall, Just 50% of Americans Plan to Get a COVID-19 Vaccine. Heres How to Win Over the Rest, 
SCIENCE (Jun. 30, 2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/06/just-50-americans-plan-get-covid-19-vaccine-
here-s-how-win-over-rest. See also Alex Hartlage, Vaccine Hesitancy Post-Covid-19: Will Our Memory Fade or 
Last?, VACCINES TODAY (Jul. 1, 2020), https://www.vaccinestoday.eu/stories/vaccine-hesitancy-post-covid-19-will-
our-memory-fade-or-last/. 
34 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Report of the SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy (2014), 
http://www.who.int/immunization/sage/meetings/2014/october/1_Report_WORKING_GROUP_vaccine_hesitancy_
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philosophical origins, including heterogenous forms of resistance to government-endorsed 
interventions, transversal distrust of health technologies that require the insertion of extraneous 
substances into the human body, and general concerns with the ways in which biomedical research 
has historically been conducted.35 In other cases, vaccine trust is compromised due to the 
emergence of more recent problems, techniques and even political or social agendas.36 The topic 
of vaccine misinformation, particularly in the online context, falls under the latter category. While 
not new, vaccine misinformation has been exponentially exacerbated through use (and misuse) of 
the manifold avenues for the dissemination of content opened up by the popularization of social 
media. As seen in Part II, the online circulation of vaccine misinformation is now a leading cause 
of the growth of vaccine mistrust and hesitancy. Addressing the public health and technological 
paradox posed by insufficient uptake of available vaccines thus entails considering the ways in 
which vaccine misinformation propagates online; how this propagation has been instrumentalized 
by actors with ideological or monetization purposes, or both; and the policy and legal options 
available to curb the spread of vaccine misinformation. The Essay now begins that exploration, 
starting with the historical and proximate roots of the growth of online vaccine misinformation. 
B. CHARTING THE RISE OF VACCINE MISINFORMATION 
Topics surrounding the development and administration of vaccines have long been 
especially polarizing. For example, instances of popular opposition to vaccination recommended 
by public health authorities have been documented as early as in nineteenth-century England.37
The expansion of vaccination mandates in the 1960s and 1970s, while overwhelmingly 
contributing to the reduction of the incidence of vaccine-preventable diseases, was also used 
instrumentally to fuel doubts about vaccines and vaccination policies in many areas across North 
final.pdf. Daniel A. Salmon et al, Vaccine Hesitancy: Causes, Consequences, and a Call to Action, 33 VACCINE D66 
(2015); David G. McIntosh et al., Vaccine Hesitancy and Refusal, 175 EUR. PAEDIATRIC ASSN 248 (2016).
35 See e.g. HIST. VACCINES, Cultural Perspectives on Vaccination (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/cultural-perspectives-vaccination; HARRIET WASHINGTON,
MEDICAL APARTHEID (2006). 
36 See infra, Part II. 
37 See generally JONATHAN M. BERMAN, ANTI-VAXXERS: HOW TO CHALLENGE A MISINFORMED MOVEMENT (2020). 
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America.38 And, in what remains perhaps the most well-known episode in the history of vaccine 
misinformation, in 1998 a study published in The Lancet, one of the worlds leading peer-reviewed 
medical journals, by then-doctor Andrew Wakefield fraudulently implied the existence of a causal 
link between the MMR vaccine (measles, mumps and rubella) and the development of autism in 
children.39 The study was immediately disputed by the medical and research communities and 
eventually retracted in 2010, the same year in which the General Medical Council in the United 
Kingdom declared that Wakefield had acted dishonestly and irresponsibly and found him guilty 
of over 30 charges of professional misconduct and banning him from practicing medicine.40
Nevertheless, the discredited study remains influential among communities questioning current 
approaches to vaccination and is often cited outside the scientific world in connection with claims 
contesting the safety of vaccines,41 or linking vaccination to conspiracy theories involving the 
pursuit of hidden political or social agendas.42
Although these examples are not exhaustive, they illustrate the idiosyncratic landscape 
against which vaccine-specific misinformation has historically proliferated. More recently, 
expressions of vaccine misinformation have gained new life, and reached new audiences, through 
online channels. For well over a decade, the internet has become one of the prime venues for the 
dissemination of content about vaccines and vaccination.43 Online channels are used to convey 
38 See Heather MacDougall & Laurence Monnais, Vaccinating in the Age of Apathy: Measles Vaccination in 
Canada 19631998, 190 CAN. J. MED. ASSN E399 (2018), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5880649/. 
39 See Fiona Godlee & Jane Smith, Wakefields Article Linking MMR Vaccine and Autism Was Fraudulent, 342 
BMJ c7452 (2011), https://www.bmj.com/content/342/bmj.c7452. 
40 See Clare Dyer, Wakefield Was Dishonest and Irresponsible over MMR Research, Says GMC, 340 BMJ c593 
(2010), https://www.bmj.com/content/340/bmj.c593, A Timeline of the Wakefield Retraction, 16 NAT. MED. (2010), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/nm0310-248b. 
41 See e.g. Clyde Haberman, A Discredited Vaccine Studys Continuing Impact on Public Health, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 
1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/us/a-discredited-vaccine-studys-continuing-impact-on-public-
health.html. 
42 See Matthew Hornsey et al., The Psychological Roots of Anti-Vaccination Attitudes: A 24-Nation Investigation, 
37 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 307 (2018). 
43 See e.g. Anna Kata, Anti-vaccine activists, Web 2.0, and the postmodern paradigm--an overview of tactics and 
tropes used online by the anti-vaccination movement [hereinafter Anti-vaccine activists, Web 2.0, and the 
postmodern paradigm], 30 VACCINE 3778 (2012), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22172504/ (documenting this 
phenomenon with regard to anti-vaccine activity); David A. Broniatowski et al., Weaponized Health 
Communication: Twitter Bots and Russian Trolls Amplify the Vaccine Debate [hereinafter Weaponized Health 
Communication], 108 AM. J PUB. HEALTH 1378 (2018), 
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304567 (documenting this phenomenon in the context of 
the spread of automated vaccine-related content in social media). 
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both accurate and inaccurate information about vaccines. The same channels that carry messages 
from the World Health Organization or the U.S. Centers for Disease Controls and Prevention can 
beand are routinelyused by citizen-publishers posting or reposting scientifically inaccurate 
vaccine-related information.44 Even more recently, they have also been used by individuals and 
automated programs purposefully circulating vaccine content with the aim of sowing or increasing 
discordvaccine disinformation.45
Social media have become the prime venues for the circulation of both misinformation and 
disinformation related to vaccines. As the second decade of the twenty-first century drew to a 
close, mainstream social media like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and YouTube had become the 
largest venues for the propagation of vaccine misinformation and disinformation. In 2018, a pivotal 
study on online disinformation reported escalating levels of activity specifically focused on the 
propagation of inaccurate vaccine-related content, labeling these recent developments as a form of 
weaponization of health communication.46
The increased circulation of inaccurate information about vaccines in social media poses 
serious challenges to public health strategies designed to curb the emergence and spread of 
infectious diseases. It presents heightened hurdles when compared to previous embodiments of 
vaccine-specific misinformation, as social media enable spreaders of misinformation to reach 
wider audiences, as well as tapping into densely interconnected networks focused on discussions 
surrounding highly divisive non-vaccine topics, such as political and electoral themes, fake news 
and the role of mainstream media, and conspiracy theories on a variety of topics.47
Part II describes the specificities of vaccine misinformation within the social media 
ecosystem, but it is worth noting here that a growing body of vaccine-focused research has found 
that the propagation of inaccurate vaccine content through social media is already creating 
significant problems for the implementation of vaccination campaigns, and contributing to the 
erosion of overall levels of trust in vaccines.48
44 See e.g. Cornelia Betsch et al., Opportunities and Challenges of Web 2.0 for Vaccination Decisions, 30 VACCINE
3727 (2012); Kata, Anti-vaccine Activists, Web 2.0, and the Postmodern Paradigm, supra note 43. 
45 Broniatowski et al., Weaponized Health Communication, supra note 43. 
46 Id., ib. 
47 See Betsch, supra note 44; Kata, supra note 43. 
48 See e.g. et al., Facebook Pages, the Disneyland Measles Outbreak, and Promotion of Vaccine Refusal as a 
Civil Right, supra note 29. 
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II. VACCINE MISINFORMATION: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
A. THE DUAL ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN VACCINE-RELATED COMMUNICATIONS
Social media rose to prominence during the transition from the 2000s to the 2010s. The 
Pew Research Center started collecting data on social media usage in 2005.49 At that point, only 
5% of adults in the United States used at least one of the then-largest social media platforms.50 In 
2011, half of all Americans were using at least one of these platforms, and by 2019 that number 
was approaching three quarters of the U.S. population.51 Among Americans aged between 18 and 
29 years old, 90% used at least one mainstream social mediawhich for purposes of the Pew 
Research Center study comprised, as of 2019, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Twitter, Pinterest, 
Snapchat, YouTube, WhatsApp and Reddit.52 The study further showed that usage of mainstream 
social media was fairly evenly distributed when race, gender and income are considered.53
However, usage of a particular social media varied significantly within these and additional 
parameters, including formal levels of education.54
The expansion of social media throughout the late 2000s and the 2010s has had an impact 
on health-related communications in the online environment. The use of social media has been 
shown to help the dissemination of public health research, inform policy debates and create venues 
for the formation of professional, patient and activist communities.55
In the case of vaccine-related communications, social media have been shown to play a 
dual role, functioning as fora and conduits for content promoting both accurate and inaccurate 
information about vaccines. On the one hand, they have become an important vehicle for efforts 
from public health-oriented institutions seeking to disseminate accurate vaccine information as 
49 Pew Research Center, Social Media Fact Sheet (Jun. 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-
sheet/social-media/. 
50 Id., ib. 
51 Id., ib. 
52 Id., ib. 
53 Id., ib. 
54 Id., ib.
55 Jessica Y. Breland, et al., Social Media as a Tool to Increase the Impact of Public Health Research, 107 AM. J.
PUBLIC HEALTH 1890 (2017). 
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part of educational campaigns, as well as campaigns design to curb vaccine hesitancy.56 On the 
other, recent studies have shown that social media function as amplifiers of both misinformation 
and disinformation on vaccine-related topics.57
This amplification results in a minority of social media users holding views that are not 
supported by the scientific status quo yielding a disproportionate amount of influence in the online 
environment by spreading anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning content more efficientlythrough 
highly connected networksthan individuals or institutions spreading accurate information about 
vaccines.58 This phenomenon is particularly salient in the case of parents of young childrenthe 
latter being typically indicated to receive more vaccines than adult populations, thus making 
parents preferred targets of misinformation in this area. Researchers have long established that an 
overwhelming majority of parents hold favorable views on vaccination. A study conducted in 2018 
in the United Kingdom found that 91% of parents regarded vaccines as important.59 At the same 
time, the study found that 41% of parents using social media reported encountering negative 
messages about vaccines or vaccination on a relatively regular basis.60 Among parents of very 
young childrendefined as under 5 years oldthat percentage climbed to 50%.61
Disproportionate amplification of vaccine misinformation also exposed users who are not 
invested in parental vaccination debates to inaccurate content about vaccines. In a 2019 
experiment, for example, a group of journalists analyzed the results of searches for the term 
vaccine on Facebook.62 The majority of results related to content opposing or questioning the 
use of vaccines.63 As discussed in Part III.B.2, data related to vaccine misinformation practices 
drawn from Facebook is especially relevant, as this particular social media platform is home to 
roughly half of the accounts associated with anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning activity. 64
56 Mark Dredze et al., Understanding Vaccine Refusal: Why We Need Social Media Now, 50 AM. J. PREV. MED. 550 
(2016). 
57 See Betsch, supra note 44; Kata, supra note 43. 
58 See Johnson et al., The Online Competition Between Pro- and Anti-Vaccination Views, infra note 136. 
59 Royal Soc'y Pub. Health, Moving the Needle: Promoting Vaccination Uptake Across the Life Course (2018), 
https://www.rsph.org.uk/static/uploaded/3b82db00-a7ef-494c-85451e78ce18a779.pdf, at 3. 
60 Id., ib.
61 Id., ib.
62 Royal Soc'y Pub. Health, Moving the Needle, supra note 59, at 3. 
63 Id., ib.
64 Broniatowski et al., supra note 48. 
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In recent years, the spread of vaccine-related content in social media has also found new 
avenues through the use of automated programs that can spread pro- and anti-vaccine or vaccine-
questioning content, or both at the same time, as explained in the following section. 
B. THE AUTOMATIZATION AND WEAPONIZATION OF VACCINE MISINFORMATION 
THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA
The use of software to disseminate online content is very common, within and outside 
social media. Studies indicate that towards the later stages of the 2010s, automatically generated 
content became pervasive across the internet. The title of a piece published in The Atlantic in 2017 
 The Internet Is Mostly Bots  aptly captured the emerging online landscape.65
A study surveying online activity throughout 2018 calculated that around 40% of online 
traffic was likely automated.66 Another study calculated that programs spreading malicious 
content67 accounted for 20.4% of automated traffic.68 Although this constituted a 6.4% drop in 
traffic linked to malicious software when compared to the findings of a similar study looking at 
data from 2017, the levels of sophistication of these programs remained consistently high.69
The use of automated software has enabled the propagation of vaccine-related content on 
increasingly larger scales and by deploying increasingly sophisticated techniques. In 2015, the 
U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) conducted a four-week challenge
dubbed the Twitter Bot Detection Challengeduring which participants analyzed vaccine-related 
65 Adrienne Lafrance, The Internet Is Mostly Bots, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 207), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/bots-bots-bots/515043/. 
66 Matthew Hughes, Bots Drove Nearly 40% of Internet Traffic Last Year  and the Naughty Ones Are Getting 
Smarter, TNW (Apr. 18, 2019), https://thenextweb.com/security/2019/04/17/bots-drove-nearly-40-of-internet-
traffic-last-year-and-the-naughty-ones-are-getting-smarter/. 
67 The study defined malicious content as content spread by bad bots. These bots are automated programs that 
scrape data from sites without permission in order to reuse it (e.g., pricing, inventory levels) and gain a competitive 




ontent=76485351&utm_source=hs_automation, at 10. 
68 Vedran Bozicevic, Industry Report: Bad Bot Landscape 2019 - The Bot Arms Race Continues, GLOBAL DOTS




tweets and attempted to identify which ones were associated with certain types of activity.70 In 
particular, the challenge focused on influence bots, which try to influence Twitter conversations 
on a specific topic.71 While the study was largely procedurally orientedseeking to examine 
strategies to detect, analyze and categorize botsit called attention to the growing sophistication 
of content automation strategies.72
A seminal study published in 2018 analyzed the dissemination of vaccine-specific content 
through Twitter between July 2014 and September 2017.73 The study contrasted automated 
programs (bots and content pollutants) with programs operated by humans but engaging in 
malicious behaviors (trolls). In line with definitions of bot in both the technical and popular 
literatures, the study looked at bots as accounts that automate content promotion in the field of 
vaccines.74 Content polluters were defined as malicious accounts identified as promoting 
commercial content and malware related to vaccines.75 And trolls were characterized as accounts 
operating in the vaccine space and exhibiting malicious behaviors yet operated by humans.76
The study found that accounts associated with sophisticated automated programs tweeted 
vaccine-related content at significantly higher rates than non-automated accounts.77 Sophisticated 
programs are more complex and better at avoiding detection than average programs.78 The study 
also found that content polluters propagated the highest amount of anti-vaccine content, at a rate 
of 75% more than non-automated accounts.79
One of the most salient findings of the study had to do with vaccine content disseminated 
through accounts located in areas of the world associated with the online promotion of 
70 V.S. Subrahmanian et al., The DARPA Twitter Bot Challenge, https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.05140, at 2. 
71 Id., at 2. Other categories of bots categorized in the study but not the goal of the challenge were spambots, which 
spread content qualifying as spam, and paybots, which use different types of strategies to illicitly generate revenue 
for the account associated with that bot. Id., ib.
72 Id., at 11. See also Emerging Technology from the arXiv, How DARPA Took on the Twitter Bot Menace with One 
Hand Behind Its Back, MIT Tech. Rev. (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/01/28/163553/how-darpa-took-on-the-twitter-bot-menace-with-one-hand-
behind-its-back/. 
73 See Broniatowski et al., Weaponized Health Communication, supra note 43. 
74 Id., at 1387. 
75 Id., at 1382. 
76 Id., ib.
77 Id., at 1378. 
78 Id., at 1382. 
79 Id., ib.
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misinformation and disinformation in other, more visible areasnamely Russia and the post-
Soviet republics, which have been linked with political misinformation and disinformation. 
Trolls traced backed to Russia were particularly active in spreading vaccine misinformation 
and disinformation. 80 They employed a two-pronged strategy, spreading both pro- and anti-
vaccine content.81 They did this as part of a broader strategy to tap into divisive topics among in 
the United States and increase discord.82 Sophisticated Twitter bots traced to other locations also 
engaged in this type of activity.83
An additional strategy employed by both bots and trolls included flooding the discourse, 
a technique that consists in increasing the circulation of content centered on a specific topicin 
this case, through tweets about vaccines or vaccinationwith the purpose of capturing social 
media traffic.84 A related strategy consisted in the use of astroturfing,85 a technique through 
which the origin of a message is made to appear as originating from grassroots organizations 
supporting a particular view.86 In the case of vaccines, astroturfing on Twitter was linked to the 
propagation of anti-vaccine content, seemingly with the purpose of conveying the impression of 
the existence of grassroots debates about the efficacy of vaccines.87 The study posited that trolls 
and semi-automated accounts (human-operated accounts occasionally also associated with bot 
activity) employed this strategy especially often, but recognized some limitations on and called for 
further study of the use of this particular technique in connection with Twitter vaccine discourse.88
The use of automated programs to spread vaccine-specific content has recently become 
intertwined with larger and more structured efforts to spread disinformation on multiple themes 
for geopolitical reasons. These efforts, emanating predominantly from Russia and certain post-
Soviet actors, are meant to increase discord among Western communities by tapping into topics 
80 Id., at 1382. 
81 Id., ib. 
82 Id., ib.
83 Id., ib.
84 Id., at 1380. See also Jeanette Sutton, Health Communication Trolls and Bots Versus Public Health Agencies 
Trusted Voices, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1281 (2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6137776/ 
(further contextualizing flooding techniques to propagate vaccine content through social media). 
85 Broniatowski et al., supra note 43, at 1382. 
86 Id., ib. 
87 Id., ib. 
88 Id., ib.
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known to be polarizing.89 These efforts further seek to undermine the credibility of public-sector 
institutions in the Western world, with a particular focus on the United States.90 These strategies 
were employed even before COVID-19 was declared a pandemic, with social media accounts 
traced back to Russia disseminating disinformation across multiple health-related areas in the 
context of COVID-19 debates.91
III. ONGOING SOCIAL MEDIA RESPONSES TO VACCINE MISINFORMATION
A. A TAXONOMY OF MAINSTREAM SOCIAL MEDIA RESPONSES
As more information on the specifics of vaccine misinformation has become available, 
social media have gradually taken steps to curb its spread. From 2019 onwards, mainstream social 
media have adopted a variety of approaches to deal with inaccurate vaccine-specific content made 
available by their users.  
1. Suppression or Zero Tolerance Approaches 
Suppression approaches, also known as zero tolerance policies, consist in the removal of 
content qualifying as inaccurate information. In the context of vaccine misinformation propagated 
through mainstream social media, this approach was pioneered by Pinterest. In February 2019, the 
company announced that it would block all vaccine-related search results.92 The decision was 
prompted by data revealing that most Pinterest searches about vaccines yielded results containing 
information that contradicted current scientific standards.93
89 See e.g. Jessica Glenza, Coronavirus: US Says Russia Behind Disinformation Campaign, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 
2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/22/coronavirus-russia-disinformation-campaign-us-officials. 
Iran has also been linked to the exploitation of health-related disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic. See 




92 See e.g. Taylor Telford, Pinterest is Blocking Search Results About Vaccines to Protect Users from 




In the case of Pinterest, this approach still allowed for users to pin vaccine-related content 
to their personal board, but that content is not made available through the search function, 
remaining confined to personal pages.94
Importantly, this was designed as a temporary measure.95 Eventually Pinterest paired this 
approach with interventive steps, consisting of the display of vaccine content originating from 
legitimate sourcesincluding the World Health Organization, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, and the American Academy of Pediatrics.96
Also in early 2019, Pinterest blocked accounts linked to groups or individuals propagating 
vaccine misinformation and disinformation.97 This approach resulted in the blocking of content 
promoted on Pinterest by the National Vaccine Information Center, an organization originally 
named Dissatisfied Parents Together and with no connection to federal agencies or public health 
authorities, which was launched in the 1980s and has since become one of the leading promoters 
of vaccine misinformation in the United States. Pinterest also blocked Larry Cook, a prominent 
figure in the anti-vaccine movement, particularly known for his use of social media channels to 
spread vaccine misinformation. 
As seen below, while Pinterest took a zero-tolerance approach to the moderation of vaccine 
content even before the COVID-19 pandemic, other social media took less restrictive approaches. 
This allowed anti-vaccine discourses to continue circulating within large swaths of the mainstream 
social media space and, with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the reach of anti-vaccine or 
vaccine-questioning content increased substantially. Larry Cook, for instance, maintained a 
Facebook group with close to 200,000 members until Facebook deleted it in late 2020.98
94 Telford, Pinterest is Blocking Search Results About Vaccines. 
95 Telford, Pinterest is Blocking Search Results About Vaccines. 
96 Erin Brodwin, How Pinterest Beat Back Vaccine Misinformation, STAT (Sept. 21, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/2020/09/21/pinterest-facebook-vaccine-misinformation/. For an illustration of how 
Pinterest shares only vaccine content produced by reputable institutions in the public health space, see Pinterest, 
Immunization https://www.pinterest.com/thephf/immunization/ (listing vaccine-related pins from institutions 
including the World Health Organization and Unicef USa) (last accessed Jan. 26, 2021). 
97 Julia Carrie Wong, Anti-Vaxx Propaganda Has Gone Viral on Facebook. Pinterest Has a Cure, GUARDIAN (Feb. 
21, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/20/pinterest-anti-vaxx-propaganda-search-facebook. 
98 Aatif Sulleyman, Facebook Bans One of the Anti-Vaccine Movement's Biggest Groups for Violating QAnon Rules, 
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/facebook-bans-anti-vaccine-group-violating-qanon-rules-
1548408. 
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The increased circulation of vaccine misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
which this Essay describes in greater detail in Part III.B.2, eventually prompted several mainstream 
social media to adopt suppression measures. In mid-October 2020, YouTube implemented a policy 
of removal of videos sharing vaccine misinformation.99
2. Limiting and Downgrading Approaches 
A different type of moderating approach consists of allowing anti-vaccine or vaccine-
questioning discourses to circulate within a given social media (or group of related social media), 
but use techniques that will make this type of content less prominent to users.  
Shortly after Pinterest implemented its initial suppression approach, Facebook announced 
that it would continue to allow anti-vaccine content to be sharedboth on Facebook and on 
Facebook-owned Instagrambut that it would limit its reach by not allowing anti-vaccine content 
to be promoted through recommendations and ads.100 Additionally, the company announced that 
it would downgrade vaccine misinformation showing up as search results.101
As is the case with suppression approaches, limiting and downgrading approaches can also 
be paired with other interventions, such as the display of credible information on vaccines 
originating from reputable institutions. 
3. Educational Approaches  
Educational approaches consist of the active promotion of accurate content about vaccines 
and vaccination, typically sourced from credible scientific or public health-oriented organizations. 
For example, a search performed on Facebook for the word vaccine in early February 2021 
directed the user to content from prominent organizations in the following order: first, the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control; second, the American Academy of Pediatrics; third, the American 
Cancer Society; fourth, the World Health Organization; and fifth, UNICEF.102 A similar search 
99 See Robert Hart, YouTube Bans Covid-19 Vaccine Misinformation, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2020/10/14/youtube-bans-covid-19-vaccine-
misinformation/?sh=8e0f4d868a9b. 
100 Louise Matsakis, Facebook Will Crack Down on Anti-Vaccine Content, WIRED (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-anti-vaccine-crack-down/. 
101 Id., ib.
102 The search was performed in English and from the United States. 
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performed on Twitter led to the appearance of a large informational panel noting that [t]o make 
sure you get the best information on vaccinations, resources are available from the US Department 
of Health & Human Services, and providing a link for, and the Twitter handle of, vaccines.gov, 
a website maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services.103
Educational approaches were adopted broadly during the COVID-19 pandemic by players 
in the online environment, both within and outside social media. For instance, in December 2020, 
as the first COVID-19 vaccines were being authorized across the world, Google began displaying 
informational panels about each type of COVID-19 vaccine as part of search results related to 
vaccines.104 This replicated a strategy previously employed by Google to counter general 
misinformation about the pandemic by showing informational panels with content provided by 
credible organizations on the SARS-CoV-2 virus and its spread, public health measures taken and 
recommended by public health authorities, as well as the location of COVID-19 testing centers.105
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT SELF-REGULATORY APPROACHES 
Overall, the steps taken by mainstream social media in response to the growing problem of 
vaccine misinformation have increased the amount and visibility of accurate information about 
vaccines in the online environment. Yet, as the case study on the moderation of vaccine content 
by Facebook presented in this section shows, social media responses have largely left the sources 
of vaccine-specific misinformation untouched. Part III.B first articulates the general shortcomings 
of current modes of self-regulation, and then presents a case study that illustrates the shortcomings 
in the response to vaccine misinformation adopted by the social media that is home to the largest 
amount of vaccine misinformation, Facebook. 
1. Transversal Shortcomings of Social Media Self-Regulation 
Social media have adopted policies to vaccine misinformation that are, on balance, 
somewhat similar. The dominant approach, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, has been 
103 The search was similarly performed in English and from the United States. See Dept. Health & Hum. Services, 
https://www.vaccines.gov/basics/safety. 





to favor educational strategies, in some cases coupled with downgrading or other limiting 
policies.106 Attempts to remove postings containing information flagged as vaccine 
misinformation have been rarer, with Pinterests suppression approach applying to vaccine content 
in general remaining exceptional.107
The availability of accurate information about vaccines on social media has been shown to 
be insufficient to counter the growing detrimental effects of online vaccine misinformation.108
Dissemination of accurate information alone does not guarantee that the content will be consumed 
or critically assimilated, and its impact on effecting behavioral changes in social media users pre-
disposed to consume vaccine misinformation has been shown to be minimal.109
Large actors promoting accurate vaccine information through social media predominantly 
resort to vaccine literacy campaigns, which consist of sharing information from credible sources 
in response to searches for vaccine- or vaccination-related topics. However, as illustrated below in 
the case of Facebook, studies have suggested that these campaigns have a modest impact and are 
likely ineffectual in countering the disproportionate escalation of anti-vaccine and vaccine-
questioning discourses in social media.110
Pages or accounts on mainstream social media promoting pro-vaccine views tend to have 
significantly larger followings than anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning pages and accounts.111 For 
instance, the Facebook page for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had around 
2 million followers in early 2020. At the same time, a large Facebook page promoting anti-vaccine 
views would draw around 40,000 followers.112 Yet, anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning pages or 
accounts tend to be dedicated to either just vaccine content or a narrow segment of health-related 
subjects. By contrast, pages or accounts associated with the CDC or the WHO are much more 
general purpose. As seen below, pages and accounts spreading negative views about vaccines were 
106 See e.g. Maryke S Steffens et al., Using Social Media for Vaccination Promotion: Practices and Challenges, 
DIGITAL HEALTH (2020), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2055207620970785 (surveying social media 
responses to vaccine misinformation). 
107 Id., ib.
108 See Terry Connolly & Jochen Reb, Toward Interactive, Internet-Based Decision Aid for Vaccination Decisions: 
Better Information Alone is Not Enough, 30 VACCINE 3813 (2012). 
109 Id., ib.
110 Infra, Part III.B.2. 
111 Jonhson et al., infra note 136. 
112 Id., ib.
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much more efficacious at spreading their content and reaching other users than pages conveying 
general-purpose, albeit pro-vaccine, information.113
Additionally, there is a significant asymmetry between the production of accurate and 
inaccurate vaccine-related content, particularly when the former is conceived as part of a set of 
educational materials.114 Content qualifying as misinformation or disinformation can be generated 
fairly quickly and inexpensively, as it does not rely on the collection, treatment and analysis of 
supporting data, such as studies or surveys. The creation of countervailing educational content, on 
the other hand, typically requires more resources, coordination of multiple data entry points and 
the time lag associated with obtaining those data and treating them for educational purposes. This 
can be especially pronounced in the case of emerging diseases like COVID-19, about which 
relatively little is known at first within the scientific community, whereas actors in the 
misinformation and disinformation arenas can quickly repackage existing content (e.g. 
unsubstantiated claims about measles vaccines producing a specific detrimental effect) and link it 
to quickly expanding debates in social media about new pathogens or public health problems (e.g. 
by making unsubstantiated claims about COVID-19 vaccines producing the same detrimental 
effect(s) claimed previously in connection with measles vaccines).115
Another problem with vaccine literacy campaigns promoted by social media is that they 
are currently structured against the backdrop of the heterogenous and largely permissive 
approaches to vaccine content moderation. The adoption of less stringent modes of responses to 
the growth of social media-based vaccine misinformation creates a porous ecosystem in which this 
type of content can continue to circulate with relative ease. This porosity, allied with the time lag 
in responses between different social media, allows for the migration of inaccurate vaccine content. 
Consider the case of Larry Cook, one of the leading figures in the online anti-vaccination 
movement. Mr. Cook has long been known for orchestrating social media campaigns urging 
followers to both question the safety of vaccines and refrain from receiving recommended 
113 Jonhson et al., infra note 136. 
114 See e.g. Renée DiResta, Virus Experts Arent Getting the Message Out, Atlantic (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/health-experts-dont-understand-how-information-




vaccines.116 Pinterest blocked Mr. Cook in February 2019.117 In response, he focused his activity 
on much larger platforms, Facebook and Twitter.118 It was not until mid-November 2020, when 
Mr. Cooks role in spreading QAnon conspiracy theories (in addition to vaccine misinformation) 
became the subject of more publicized discussions, that these two platforms also blocked Mr. 
Cook.119 This example highlights some of the costs of reliance on heterogenous modes of self-
regulation in a borderless environmentnamely how the lack of concerted efforts leaves 
significant swaths of online territory uncovered by the response of a single player; and the related 
time-gap problem, which in the example surveyed here covered both the months leading to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the entire period of the pandemic during which the first vaccines 
were being developed, tested and assessed by regulatory authorities in the United States and 
abroad. 
Additionally, some social media might not be motivated to respond to vaccine 
misinformation for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the dissemination of vaccine 
misinformation has become increasingly linked with possibilities of content monetization, as noted 
above. The case study on Facebook presented in the following section further illustrates how social 
media themselvesand not just originators of misinformationoften make money if vaccine 
misinformation is consumed by large groups of users.120
Finally, in addition to problems inherent to lack of uniformity, stringency and motivation 
to intervene, current social media responses are also hampered by technical limitations.121 These 
limitations further accentuate concerns that overall approaches to the spread of vaccine 
misinformation across social media may be lacking. Examples of these limitations are manifold. 
For instance, Facebook uses a machine-learning algorithm to detect both hate speech and 
misinformation.122 Most content flagged by the algorithm as falling under either of these categories 
is then screened by a human, although in cases in which the algorithm determines that there is a 
116 See Sulleyman, Facebook Bans One of the Anti-Vaccine Movement's Biggest Groups for Violating QAnon Rules, 
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121 See infra notes 122-125 and accompanying text. 
122 See Karen Hao, Facebookʼs AI is Still Largely Baffled by Covid Misinformation, MIT TECH. REV. (May 12, 
2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/12/1001633/ai-is-still-largely-baffled-by-covid-misinformation/. 
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high probability that the content amounts to hate speech or misinformation, the program removes 
it automatically.123 The algorithm is very good at performing its screening function in areas where 
it has been trained on data for extended periods of time. By late 2019 it was able to detect 88.8% 
of all hate speech on Facebook, for example.124 However, the emergence of eventsand by 
extension, datamaterially different from the ones on which the algorithm has been trained 
drastically reduces the accuracy and speed of automated screening. The time it takes to train the 
algorithm on emerging data needed to contextualize the screening process renders it much less 
effective for addressing large-scale events with a quick onset accompanied by an exponential 
increase in the proliferation of new forms of problematic content. This was the case of the COVID-
19 pandemic, during which Facebook had to rely on human-based screening of content potentially 
qualifying as COVID-related misinformation over 60% of the time.125
A study published in October 2020, as the first COVID-19 vaccines were poised to receive 
emergency authorization in the United States and Europe, showed that YouTubes newly adopted 
policy of removing videos propagating COVID-19 misinformation routinely failed to capture a 
significant amount of anti-vaccine videos in Portuguese that were being shred on YouTube.126
Portuguese is the seventh most-spoken language in the world, with around 220 million native 
speakers.127
All these shortcomings combine to form a social media ecosystem in which vaccine 
misinformation continues to travel with relative ease, even as more social media revise their 
vaccine-specific misinformation policiesmany of them driven by pressure stemming from the 
growth of misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
123 Id., ib.. See also Guy Rosen, Community Standards Enforcement Report, November 2019 Edition, FACEBOOK
(Nov. 13, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/11/community-standards-enforcement-report-nov-2019/. 
124 Hao, supra note 122. 
125 Id., ib.. See also Roshan Sumbaly et al., Using AI to Detect COVID-19 Misinformation and Exploitative Content, 
FACEBOOK (May 12, 2020), https://ai.facebook.com/blog/using-ai-to-detect-covid-19-misinformation-and-
exploitative-content. 
126 See Dayane Fumiyo Tokojima Machado et al., Natural Stings: Selling Distrust About Vaccines on Brazilian 
YouTube, FRONT. COMMUN., (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2020.577941/full. 
See also Fernanda Ferreira, Antivaccine Videos Slip Through YouTubes Advertising Policies, New Study Finds, 
SCIENCE (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/11/antivaccine-videos-slip-through-youtube-s-
advertising-policies-new-study-finds. 
127 See James Lane, The 10 Most Spoken Languages in the World, BABEL (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.babbel.com/en/magazine/the-10-most-spoken-languages-in-the-world. 
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2. The Growth of Vaccine Misinformation on Social Media During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic: The Case of Facebook 
The propagation of misinformation about health-related topics grew significantly in recent 
years, and gained new momentum with the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in the online 
environment.128 As the race to develop COVID-19 vaccines became central to national and global 
responses to the pandemic, misinformation focused specifically on vaccines and vaccination 
proliferated especially quickly.129
A study published by the Center to Counter Digital Hate in July 2020 examined over four 
hundred accounts associated with the largest social media platforms  Facebook, Facebook-owned 
Instagram, YouTube and Twitter  looking for increases in the following of anti-vaccine or 
vaccine-questioning content.130 Among the accounts surveyed, the largest 197 (measured by 
number of followers) had added over 8 million followers since 2019.131 While the period surveyed 
in the study partly pre-dates the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, it illustrates a trend that 
continued to unfold in later months of the pandemic.132
Another 2020 study, published in Nature, provided data on the dynamics of vaccine 
misinformation disseminated through Facebook.133 The takeaways from this study are especially 
128 Editorial Board, Coronavirus Misinformation Needs Researchers to Respond, NATURE (May 28, 2020), 
https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-020-01550-y/d41586-020-01550-y.pdf. 
129 See e.g. Jason Murdock, Anti-Vax Posts Against Future COVID-19 Vaccine Steadily Increasing on Social Media, 
Researchers Warn, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/coronavirus-antivax-misinformation-
rising-social-media-pinterest-research-1525073. 
130 CTR. COUNTER DIGITAL HATE, The Anti-Vaxx Industry: How Big Tech Powers and Profits from Vaccine 
Misinformation [hereinafter The Anti-Vaxx Industry] (2020), https://252f2edd-1c8b-49f5-9bb2-
cb57bb47e4ba.filesusr.com/ugd/f4d9b9_6910f8ab94a241cfa088953dd5e60968.pdf. 
131 Id., ib.
132 See e.g. Alexandra S. Levine, Misinformation About the Vaccine Could Be Worse Than Disinformation About 
The Elections, POLITICO (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/21/social-media-vaccine-
misinformation-449770; Lois Becket, Misinformation 'Superspreaders': Covid Vaccine Falsehoods Still Thriving on 
Facebook and Instagram, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/06/facebook-
instagram-urged-fight-deluge-anti-covid-vaccine-falsehoods; Shannon Bond, 'The Perfect Storm': How Vaccine 
Misinformation Spread To The Mainstream, NPR (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/10/944408988/the-
perfect-storm-how-coronavirus-spread-vaccine-misinformation-to-the-mainstrea (collectively noting the unabated 
circulation of vaccine misinformation in late 2020 and early 2021). 
133 Neil F. Johnson et al., The Online Competition Between Pro- and Anti-Vaccination Views, 582 NATURE 230 
(2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2281-1. 
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valuable because Facebook, at over 2.6 billion users,134 is both the most widely used social media 
platform and the largest social media venue for the propagation of vaccine misinformation.135
The Nature study looked for Facebook users who had shared views about vaccines, 
irrespective of their leanings on the topic. It identified 100 million relevant accounts for which 
there was evidence that vaccine content was being sharing or consumed.136 Users active in the 
vaccine space on Facebook were located in multiple countries and operating in a variety of 
languages.137 In spite of the ideological differences between users sharing or consuming pro- and 
anti-vaccine content, the study showed that Facebook users with an interest in vaccine content 
were becoming increasingly more connected.138
Mimicking what happens outside the context of social media, the majority of Facebook 
users active in the sharing or consumption of vaccine content have favorable views about 
vaccines.139 Nonetheless, users questioning vaccines and sharing or consuming anti-vaccine 
content formed more clusters. A cluster was defined as a Facebook page and associated followers. 
The study found that vaccine-questioning and anti-vaccine clusters were twice as numerous than 
pro-vaccine clusters.  
The same study also revealed that anti-vaccine clusters on Facebook were much better at 
reaching Facebook users with seemingly undecided views on vaccines or vaccination than pro-
vaccine ones.140 The study also showed that undecided users, estimated to amount to 50 million, 
are now considerably more active than what was previously known, conducting searches for 
vaccine related-content and engaging with anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning clusters at high 
rates.141 Strategies used by clusters disseminating anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning content 
134 Facebook had over 2.6 billion users at the time of the Nature study. See Andrew Hutchinson, Facebook Closes in 
on New Milestone of 3 Billion Total Users Across its Platforms, SOC. MEDIA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/facebook-closes-in-on-new-milestone-of-3-billion-total-users-across-its-
pla/577048/. By the end of 2020, that number had increased to 2.8 billion. See Statista, Number of monthly active 
Facebook users worldwide as of 4th quarter 2020 (Feb. 2, 2021), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/. 
135 See The Anti-Vaxx Industry, supra note 130. 
136 Johnson, The Online Competition Between Pro- and Anti-Vaccination Views, supra note 133. 
137 Id., ib.
138 Id., ib.
139 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
140 Johnson, The Online Competition Between Pro- and Anti-Vaccination Views, supra note 133. 
141 Id., ib.
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had become robust and resilient, thus significantly limiting the persuasive effect of techniques 
employed by pro-vaccine Facebook clusterswhich consisted primarily of sharing vaccine 
information from credible institutions and sources.142
During the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, Facebook added 850,000 users 
following anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning pages.143 This bolstered the number of Facebook 
users following this type of content to close to 30 million  which corresponds to nearly half of all 
followers of vaccine misinformation across the most popular social media.144
Before and throughout the pandemic, Facebook also remained the prime social media 
venue for the monetization of anti-vaccine or vaccine-questioning content through implementation 
of marketing funnel strategies.145 These strategies consist of attracting followers through an 
initial channel, which then redirects users interested in further related content to venues outside 
the social media platform, where they are often invited to purchase goods or services. In the context 
of vaccine misinformation on Facebook, marketing funneling targets users or followers of anti-
vaccine pages by inviting them to sign up for email newsletters or a similar mechanism, through 
which additional vaccine- or health-related material is made available free of charge.146 This 
material often consists of videos hosted on other social media or personal webpages.147 The final 
step in these funneling strategies occurs when this free content is then linked to offers to purchase 
additional content or goods. In the case of vaccines, these goods are often associated with products 
perceived as alternative medicine, natural (as opposed to vaccines, which in anti-vaccine 
discourse are portrayed as chemical-dense and thus harmful) or similar signifiers. In some cases, 
consumption of these products can be problematic: studies show that Facebook pages enabling 
marketing funneling strategies in this area often link to goods like dietary supplements, a type of 
142 Id., ib. See also Ana Santos Rutschman, Facebooks Latest Attempt to Address Vaccine MisinformationAnd 
Why Its Not Enough, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20201029.23107/full/. 
143 The Anti-Vaxx Industry, supra note 130. 
144 Id., ib.
145 See e.g. Anatoli Colicev et al., Modeling the Relationship Between Firm and User Generated Content and the 
Stages of the Marketing Funnel, 39 INTL J. RES. MKT. 100 (2019), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167811618300508. 
146 The Anti-Vaxx Industry, supra note 130. 
147 Id., ib.
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product over which the FDA has extremely tenuous oversight.148 Some of the dietary supplements 
known to be offered for purchase at the end of marketing funneling strategies initiating from anti-
vaccine and vaccine-questioning pages on Facebook have been the subject of warnings issued by 
public-health oriented agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH). For instance, a 
dietary supplement sometimes promoted in this context is colloidal silver (silver particles in a 
liquid solution), for which the NIH maintains a warning, cautioning consumers that [s]cientific 
evidence doesnt support the use of colloidal silver dietary supplements for any disease or 
condition and that [i]n fact, colloidal silver can be dangerous to your health.149
In addition to strategies that enable potential monetization of anti-vaccine or vaccine-
questioning content in mediated ways, social media also provide a pathway for the direct 
monetization of this type of content, and social media platforms themselves can benefit from this 
pathway. The study conducted by the Center to Counter Digital Hate used the average revenue per 
person rate used by Facebook to determine how much the company could make directly by 
allowing anti-vaccine and vaccine-questioning content to be shared on its pages and groups.150 By 
looking at both Facebook and Facebook-owned Instagram, the study estimated this direct revenue 
stream to be worth around US $23 million.151
While the COVID-19 pandemic presented heightened challenges, it also replicated some 
of the phenomena observed during social media responses to vaccine misinformation during 
preceding, smaller-scale public health crises.152 The response from Facebook is also telling from 
this perspective, as pre-COVID-19 analyses of social media approaches to the spread of vaccine 
misinformation should have been regarded as informative about the shortcomings of ongoing 
forms of self-regulation.  
148 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (defining dietary supplement). See generally Roseann B. Termin & Vincent Sannuti, A 
Look Back at DSHEA  Over 25 Years Later: The Dangers of a Reactionary Approach to Dietary Supplement 
Regulation, 22 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. (2019); Joanna Sax, Dietary Supplements Are Not All Safe and Not All 
Food: How the Low Cost of Dietary Supplements Preys on the Consumer, 41 AM. J. L. & MED. (2015); Richard E. 
Novak, DSHEA'S Failure: Why a Proactive Approach to Dietary Supplement Regulation is Needed to Effectively 
Protect Consumers, U. ILL. L. REV. 1045 (2010) (collectively highlighting the shortcomings of the current 
regulatory regime for dietary supplements). 
149 U.S. Natl. Insts. Health, Colloidal Silver (2017), https://www.nccih.nih.gov/health/colloidal-silver. 
150 The Anti-Vaxx Industry, supra note 130. 
151 Id., ib.
152 See Broniatowski et al., Facebook Pages, the Disneyland Measles Outbreak, and Promotion of Vaccine 
Refusal as a Civil Right, 20092019, supra note 48. 
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As separate outbreaks of the same vaccine-preventable diseases (measles) occurred 
throughout the United States in 2019, several mainstream social media began altering their policies 
regarding the moderation of vaccine-specific content.153 While Pinterest adopted a suppression 
approach, later paired with educational measures,154 Facebook and other mainstream social media 
elected to continue allowing users to post and share content qualifying as vaccine 
misinformation.155 Data show that, under a policy that left most of the sources of vaccine 
misinformation available on Facebook untouched, anti-vaccine and vaccine-questioning clusters 
grew exponentially more than other clusters.156 The most active anti-vaccine or vaccine-
questioning clusters grew by more than 300%.157 By contrast, not a single pro-vaccine cluster 
exceeded a 100% increase in growth, with most growth rates for pro-vaccine clusters averaging 
less than 50%.158 No similarly comprehensive data are yet available for other mainstream social 
media, although emerging studies indicate that social media that do not attempt to restrict anti-
vaccine and vaccine-questioning content, opting primarily for educational approaches, are unlikely 
to curb the spread of vaccine misinformation.159
The experience with the moderation of vaccine content before the pandemic also indicated 
that, even when companies announce policies that seemingly restrict the posting or sharing of 
vaccine misinformation, the actual effects of these policies can be minimal.160 Once again, the case 
of Facebook is illuminating. In October 2020, the company announced that it would ratchet up its 
vaccine misinformation policy as part of an effort primarily designed to promote accurate 
153 See Rachel Becker, Facebook Outlines Plans to Curb Anti-Vax Conspiracy Theories, VERGE (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/7/18255107/facebook-anti-vaccine-misinformation-measles-outbreaks-group-
page-recommendations-removal; Julia Belluz, Facebook, Pinterest, and YouTube are Cracking Down on Fake 
Vaccine News, VOX (Sept. 5, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/1/18244384/measles-outbreak-vaccine-
washington. 
154 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
155 Broniatowski, supra note 48; Belluz, supra note 153. 
156 Johnson, The Online Competition Between Pro- and Anti-Vaccination Views, supra note 133. 
157 Id., ib.
158 Id., ib.
159 Id., ib. See also Becket, Misinformation 'Superspreaders': Covid Vaccine Falsehoods Still Thriving on Facebook 
and Instagram, supra note 132. 
160 See Johnson, The Online Competition Between Pro- and Anti-Vaccination Views, supra note 133; Rutschman, 
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information on vaccines in collaboration with public health agencies and other organizations.161
As flu season was approaching, the new policy was built around the publicization of information 
about flu vaccines, touching indirectly on the possibility of COVID-19 vaccines becoming 
available in the near future.162 Per the new policy, Facebook would start promoting content about 
seasonal flu vaccines provided by credible organization, as well as providing users with sharable 
vaccination reminders.163 At the same time, the company announced that the policy would also 
include the rejection of ads explicitly discouraging people from getting vaccinated.164
Although the new policy with regard to ads appears to fall underand was described as
a suppression-like approach, in practice it was extremely limited.165 The policy created a very 
broad exception to the prohibition on anti-vaccine ads, by continuing to allow ads as long as they 
can be construed as advocating for or against legislation or government policies around vaccines 
 including a COVID-19 vaccine.166 Facebook coupled the exceptional approach for these ads 
with a screening mechanism it deploys to moderate certain categories of speech, including political 
speech: the company screens the ad before making it available, and adds a label to the ad 
identifying who paid for it.167 Similarly, the revised policy did not cover private pages sharing 
vaccine-related content on Facebook, whether pro- or anti-vaccine, effectively leaving the major 
Facebook-specific fora for the propagation of vaccine misinformation untouched.168
Although the findings summarized in this section are based on data and studies focused on 
Facebookreflecting a particular interest in the company, given its disproportionately large 
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footprint in enabling online vaccine discoursesthey are not restricted to Facebook.169 They 
illustrate the norm, with suppression approaches like the one adopted by Pinterest being the 
exception. The current social media environment is therefore characterized by self-regulatory 
approaches to the moderation of vaccine-related content that do not remove or meaningfully isolate 
the sources of misinformation. As further discussed below, several commentators have begun to 
call for more uniformly stringent approaches to vaccine-specific misinformation circulating across 
social media, a problem to which the Essay now turns. 
IV. CURBING VACCINE MISINFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION: THE CASE FOR MORE 
STRINGENT SOFT-LAW APPROACHES
The Essay now considers potential ways of adding stringency to ongoing modes of self-
regulation of vaccine misinformation, and explores pathways to build cooperative monitoring and 
mutual assistance networks in this area. Part IV.A looks at recent steps taken by the European 
Union in response to the proliferation of online misinformationsurveying the frameworks 
adopted before the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as changes made or proposed in direct response 
to the growth of misinformation during the pandemic. Although largely reliant on a soft law 
approachthrough the adoption of non-binding instruments170 European regulators succeeded 
in creating the first large-scale framework for the regulation of misinformation propagated through 
social media, as well as in attracting most mainstream social media as signatories.171 While the 
framework, which was designed to address misinformation in general, has had limited success in 
curbing the spread of vaccine misinformation, Part IV. B argues that the basic features of this 
framework can and should be adapted to respond to specific challenges posed by vaccine 
misinformation. The Essay concludes by suggesting several starting points in the creation of such 
a tailored framework. 
169 See Claire Wardle & Eric Singerman, Too Little, Too Late: Social Media Companies Failure to tackle Vaccine 
Misinformation Poses a Real Threat, 372 BRIT. MED. J. (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.bmj.com/content/372/bmj.n26. 
See also Belluz, supra note 153. 
170 See e.g. Daniel Bodansky, Legally Binding Versus Non-Legally Binding Instruments, in TOWARDS A WORKABLE 
AND EFFECTIVE CLIMATE REGIME, BARRETT ET AL., EDS. (2015).  
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A. A STARTING POINT: EXPANDING THE EXISTING REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE
The steps taken by the European Union to curb the growth of misinformation and 
disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic built on pre-existing soft law frameworks 
targeting misinformation and disinformation at large. In 2015, following the reporting of online 
disinformation campaigns originating in Russia, the European Council established an ad hoc 
taskforcethe East Strategic Communication Task Force172and directed different groups to 
gather information, develop best practices and collaborate with European Union institutions, 
international organizations and other stakeholders across areas impacted by misinformation and 
disinformation.173 Even though the first steps taken by the European Union were driven in large 
part by concerns and disinformation in connection with upcoming elections,174 the resulting action 
plan, published in 2018, provided a general-purpose framework to address disinformation 
problems affecting both the European Union as a whole and individual member-states.175
Specifically, the Action Plan Against Disinformation focused on disinformation spread through 
online channels and led to the development and adoption of the Code of Practice on 
Disinformation, the creation of the European Union Observatory Against Disinformation and of 
several educational initiatives on media and online literacy.176
The Code of Practice on Disinformation has been hailed as marking the first time 
worldwide that industry has agreed, on a voluntary basis, to self-regulatory standards to fight 
disinformation.177 It provides definitional clarity about what constitutes disinformation in the 
online environment; enunciates commitments adopted by industry signatories; and includes an 
annex describing a set of best practices to be adopted by industry, linking each recommended 
172 See e.g. Eur. Union, Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/-questions-and-answers-about-the-east-stratcom-
task-force_en. 
173 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan against Disinformation, EUR. COMMISSION
(Dec. 5, 2018) [hereinafter E.U. Action Plan against Disinformation], https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/action-plan-against-disinformation, at 2. 
174 E.U. Action Plan against Disinformation, at 1-2. 
175 E.U. Action Plan against Disinformation. 
176 Eur. Union Disinformation Lab, Action Plan Against Disinformation, https://www.disinfo.eu/resources/eu-
actions/other-eu-initiatives/. 
177 Eur. Commission, Code of Practice on Disinformation, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/code-
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practice to a policy actually adopted by a specific social media platform, search engine or other 
online actor.178
The Code defines disinformation as verifiably false or misleading information meeting 
two cumulative criteria: first, it refers to content created, presented and disseminated for 
economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public; and second, such content may cause public 
harm.179 Importantly, the Code defines public harm in the context of the spread of online 
disinformation as threats to democratic political and policymaking processes as well as public 
goods such as the protection of EU citizens health, the environment or security.180 The inclusion 
of harms to public or individual health is especially relevant for debates on how to best address 
the specific problems caused by vaccine- and health-related misinformation. 
Still at the definitional level, the Code also expressly recognizes categories that fall outside 
the purview of ongoing efforts undertaken by the European Union to curb the spread of 
disinformation in the online environment. It states that the operational concept of disinformation 
adopted by signatories of the Code does not include misleading advertising, reporting errors, 
satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan news and commentary, and is without prejudice to 
binding legal obligations, self-regulatory advertising codes, and standards regarding misleading 
advertising.181
The requirements set forth by the Code range from obligations relative to the placement of 
advertisements (such as allowing for third-party verification of content and using verification 
tools)182 to the prioritization of the promotion of accurate information to the detriment of 
misinformation.183 In order to monitor actual adoption of these obligations, the Code required 
signatories to provide annual updates on their policies and practices,184 and established a one-year 
assessment period.185 Annex II of the Code currently complements this framework through a 
178 Id., ib. See also Code of Practice on Disinformation, Annex II, 
https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2018-
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fourteen-page document providing language that develops each of the commitments articulated in 
the Code into discrete best practices.186 The Annex further provides a link next to each best practice 
directing readers to actual policies adopted by signatories and currently in place.187
The self-regulation framework laid out by the Code was complemented by the 
establishment of the European Union Observatory Against Disinformation.188 The Observatory 
collects information on disinformation, publishes reports, organizes educational events (such as 
webinars), publishes informational materials (such as toolkits on topics like data intelligence189) 
and provides free fact checking technology to fact checkers, media organizations, researchers, 
social media and policy makers interested in collaborating with the Observatory.190
And finally, the educational portion of the European Unions strategy to curb 
disinformation was further developed through a 2018 amendment to the 2010 Media Directive.191
While directives are binding legal instruments under European law192 and hence escape the roster 
of soft law mechanisms surveyed in this section, it is worth noting here that it showcases how the 
European Union embedded a part (albeit small) of its programmatic response to online 
disinformation into a hard law instrument.  
Drawing on this pre-existing framework, the European Union noted that the growth of 
online misinformation and disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic required the adoption 
of more stringent measures to monitor, report and curb the spread of misinformationparticularly 
in cases in which the promotion of inaccurate content could lead to harms to individual or public 
health.193 In June 2020, the European Commission issued a Communication about disinformation 
186 Id., Annex II, supra note 178. 
187 Id., ib.
188 European Union Observatory Against Disinformation, https://www.disinfobservatory.org 
189 See Id., D3.3 Data Intelligence Toolkit Description (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.disinfobservatory.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/D3.3-Data-Inteligence-toolkit-description.pdf. 
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in the context of the pandemic.194 The Communication framed the proliferation of misinformation 
and disinformation as an infodemic,195 a term used to highlight the perils of misinformation 
phenomena during the management of disease outbreaks.196 It then called for a better calibration 
of response to misinformation and disinformation, and it urged stakeholders to distinguish 
between illegal content, as defined by law, and content that is harmful but not illegal.197 Noting 
that efforts should focus on cases in which there is intention to deceive or cause public harm, or 
to make economic gain, the Communication then called for all parts of society to be involved 
in a more robust response to the infodemic.198 The specific measures proposed by the European 
Commission included the development of better monitoring and reporting channels both within 
the European Union (between member-states, as well as between member-states and European 
regulators)199 and between the European Union and regional or international players.200 At the 
regional level, the European Union singled out the Western Balkans and Africa as its immediate 
neighborhood, and gave priority status to collaborations with countries in these areas.201
The Communication also requested more transparency from social media platforms in the 
implementation of their misinformation and disinformation policies, and argued that the 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms established in the Code of Practice on Disinformation 
should be applicable to non-signatories.202 This proposal specifically reacted to the absence of 
prominent social media from the self-regulation framework created by the Code, with the 
Commission singling out WhatsApp and TikTok.203 However, the Communication was silent on 
194 Id., at 1. 
195 Id. ib. The use of the concept of infodemic matches conceptual approaches adopted by multiple international 
institutions. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Managing the COVID-19 Infodemic: Promoting Healthy Behaviours and 
Mitigating the Harm from Misinformation and Disinformation, https://www.who.int/news/item/23-09-2020-
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https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-73510-5. See also J. Zarocostas, How to Fight an Infodemic, 395 
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how a non-binding framework could be extended to non-signatories or, alternatively, how non-
signatories could be persuaded to self-regulate in accordance with the European framework. 
Additional proposed measures included the allocation of more resources towards fact-
checking204 and educational campaigns.205 Moreover, noting the exponential growth of health-
related misinformation and disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Communication 
underscored how some aspects of disinformation can be dealt with through established bodies of 
law, particularly when monetization of health-related disinformation occurs through the offer to 
sell products for which there is very little to no regulatory oversight: 
Manipulation, deceptive marketing techniques, fraud, and 
scams exploit fears in order to sell unnecessary, ineffective 
and potentially dangerous products under false health 
claims, or to lure consumers into buying products at 
exorbitant prices. Whilst this kind of content may contain 
disinformation, if it infringes the consumers acquis it is 
illegal content and requires a different response, under 
consumers protection laws and by competent authorities.206
In response to this problem, the Commission proposed increasing funding for the 
Consumer Protection Cooperation Network, a network of national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws.207 The Network was established in 2007 to allow 
national authorities to share best practices and to function as a mutual assistance mechanism.208
European regulations make the provision of assistance mandatory through timely compliance with 
information requests and requests to assist with enforcement measures, as well as the obligation to 
alert the European Commission and other member states when a breach occurs.209 Moreover, 
Network engages in area-specific website monitoring, periodically conducting sweeps, 
204 Id., at 9-10. 
205 Id., at 13-14. 
206 Id., at 14. 
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systematic screenings of websites in a given sector offering fixed/mobile phone, internet, audio 
and video streaming services.210 The first sweep, conducted in 2017, monitored 207 websites and 
found 163 violations of European consumer law.211 For the following sweeps, the Network 
partnered with authorities in countries outside the European Union (Iceland and Norway) to 
expand the reach of its monitoring activities, and increased the number of websites being 
monitored (560 in 2018 and 481 in 2019).212
Most recently, in late January 2021, the European Union called for greater efforts to nudge 
social media to begin de-monetizing disinformation.213 The European Commission is currently 
pondering the adoption of specific measures to achieve this goal, including potential additions to 
the Digital Services Act,214 a set of reformscurrently in draft formto the European laws 
regulating the activity of online platforms (a category that includes, but is not limited to, social 
media platforms).215
B. INCORPORATING TOOLS TO ADDRESS VACCINE-SPECIFIC MISINFORMATION AND 
DISINFORMATION
The combined reliance on soft law and social media voluntarism as the primary way of 
curbing the escalation of misinformation circulating online has so far failed to meaningfully 
address the problems posed by the propagation of vaccine-specific contentand especially 
inaccurate vaccine content, as described in Part III. Yet, ongoing soft law frameworks applicable 
to misinformation in general provide several important clues on how to develop monitoring and 
response mechanisms tailored to the characteristics of, and problems posed by, vaccine-specific 
210 See Single Market Scoreboard, supra note 208, at 3-5. 
211 Id., at 4. 
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misinformation. The Essay now sets forth three arguments in support of creating such a tailored 
system through soft law and self-regulation as opposed to other types of interventions, and explains 
how they could be developed to target vaccine misinformation. 
First, creating a framework that specifically targets vaccine misinformation propagated 
through social media is necessary in light of the idiosyncrasies of the vaccine misinformation 
ecosystem,216 as social media communities active in vaccine debates operate in highly specialized 
ways vis-à-vis communities engaged in debates focused on other themes. Additionally, a tailored 
framework is necessary because of the specific challenges that consumption of vaccine 
misinformation may pose to individual and public health. Exposure to vaccine misinformation on 
social media has been linked with the growth of skepticism towards vaccines,217 the increase in 
vaccination delays218 and a decrease in vaccination rates.219 Research has also suggested that 
repeated exposure to vaccine misinformation on social media is likely to increase vaccine 
hesitancy,220 which in turn may lead individuals to skip or unnecessarily delay receiving a vaccine, 
or having their children vaccinated.221 The failure of current approaches in curbing the expansion 
of vaccine misinformation through loosely designed self-regulatory frameworks, allied to the 
health-related problems connected with consumption of vaccine misinformation circulating on 
social media, suggests that additional steps are necessaryand that future interventions should 
take into greater account the features of vaccine-specific misinformation that differentiate it from 
other types of misinformation. 
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Second, and in spite of the failures noted above,222 building a framework tailored to vaccine 
misinformation is best accomplished through continued reliance on soft law as a mechanism to 
achieve more stringency in self-regulation, rather than through interventions entailing the use of 
hard law mechanisms. A shift towards the adoption of binding legal mechanisms can provide a 
homogenous solutionby requiring that all social media implement the same measures; impose a 
stringent approach to the moderation of vaccine-related contentsuch as default suppression 
approaches that extend to private groups or pages within social media, coupled with the 
suppression of monetization channels; and create an environment that facilitates enforcement 
actionsby establishing actionable behaviors and corresponding consequences. Yet, such a shift 
towards hard law would likely be met with several political economy hurdles and may even be 
counterproductive in light of the dynamics of contemporary anti-vaccine and vaccine-questioning 
discourses. On the political economy side of things, passing legislation at the domestic level is a 
time-consuming and politically fraught endeavor. Moreover, legislation imposing restrictions on 
content-based speech is bound to face protracted scrutiny and, depending on the specific 
embodiments of these restrictions, be of dubious legalityfor instance, under long-held First 
Amendment jurisprudence in the United States, which has traditionally approached content-based 
restrictions as presumptively invalid223 and created very few permissible categorical exceptions.224
If hard law approaches were instead (or complementary) adopted at the transnational level, time 
and buy-in problems would also likely occur, as the negotiation of treaties and other multi-lateral 
agreements is notoriously lengthy, both procedurally and due to the need to harmonize competing 
geopolitical interests in areas often adjacent to the one being regulated. 
In addition to political economy problems, singling out vaccine-related speech as 
exceptional may be counterproductive by increasing animosity towards government interventions 
in the ideologically fraught area of vaccines.225 As such, it can fuel the instrumentalization of anti-
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vaccine and vaccine-questioning discoursesin particular, the strands of these discourses that 
border on conspiracy theories according to which the government, or representatives thereof, are 
portrayed as promoting semi-hidden vaccination agendas in multiple ways, including through the 
suppression of dissenting voices in vaccine debates.226  This is a problem that the use of soft law 
cannot fully addressalthough, by interposing social media and other entities (such as monitoring 
organizations) in the regulation of content related to vaccines, it may lessen perceived links 
between efforts to curb vaccine-specific misinformation and the role of the government in vaccine 
policy. 
Against this backdrop, the third argument in favor of bolstering current frameworks for 
social media self-regulation of vaccine misinformation relies on the fact that there is already an 
incipient regulatory framework in place that can be further tailored to specific needs in this area. 
The approach taken by the European Unionwhich resulted in the current, albeit insufficient, self-
regulation framework adopted by social mediaprovides some clues on how to create a tailored 
and potentially more stringent regime targeting vaccine misinformation. To begin with, a 
framework akin to the Code of Practice on Disinformation can and should be developed for vaccine 
misinformation: a Code of Practice on Vaccine Misinformation, providing conceptual clarity on 
what constitute both vaccine misinformation and vaccine disinformation; articulating 
commitments to be adopted by industry; and providing best practice language that can be 
incorporated into social media vaccine-specific policies.227
While creating a code does not translate into automatic industry adoption of the proposed 
framework, it can have an important nudging effect, particularly in light of current concerns about, 
and goodwill towards, vaccines and vaccination campaigns in the context of a global pandemic. 
Bargaining with social media to persuade them to adopt more stringent forms of moderation of 
vaccine content (i.e. defaulting to suppression approaches that may include blocking private 
groups spreading vaccine-specific misinformation) disrupts fewer established interests than wider 
approaches. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has not only reawakened public perceptions 
about the public health value of vaccines. It has also called attention to the fact that scientists have 
226 See e.g. Jon D. Lee, The Utter Familiarity of Even the Strangest Vaccine Conspiracy Theories, THE ATLANTIC
(Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/01/familiarity-strangest-vaccine-conspiracy-
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long called attention to the likely increasing frequency at which pandemics or large-scale 
epidemics are likely to occur in the near future.228 Because the development and deployment of 
vaccines is predicted to play an important role in the response to these events, self-regulating actors 
may be more willing to adopt more stringent frameworks in this area as opposed to in connection 
with misinformation in general. 
In addition to a more stringent regulatory framework, there is also a need for greater 
institutional monitoring dedicated to vaccine-specific misinformation circulating in the social 
media environment. Creation of an observatory-like structure in the United States, potentially 
modeled after the Observatory Against Disinformation established by the European Union and 
focused exclusively on vaccine misinformation,229 would contribute to the collection and 
analytical treatment of data on the idiosyncrasies of this sub-type of misinformation. A vaccine 
misinformation observatory can also play important informative and educational roles, similar to 
the ones currently played by the Observatory Against Disinformation in its general-purpose 
approach to disinformation. Lastly, a dedicated observatory can also provide a basic technological 
infrastructure, in the form of screening tools that can be used by fact-checkers and other monitoring 
agentsand even social media themselvesoperating in the vaccine misinformation 
ecosystem.230
Still at the institutional level, part of the European response to the surge of activity 
qualifying as disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic hinged on broadening its cooperation 
both within member-states and externally.231 A tailored response to vaccine misinformation could 
benefit from the formation of monitoring networks with mutual assistance protocols (or even 
obligations, as in the case of the E.U. Consumer Protection Cooperation Network) dedicated to the 
monitoring of, and data sharing on, vaccine misinformation.232 These networks can be established 
at the national or transnational level (or both). In addition to focusing only geographical 
immediate neighborhoods as the European Union did, some countries may consider the 
formation of language neighborhoods. For instance, the United States might benefit from 
228 See e.g. See e.g. Julia Belluz, 4 Reasons Disease Outbreaks Are Erupting Around the World, VOX (May 31, 2016), 
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forming monitoring networks with other English-speaking countries. Conversely, given the 
shortcomings of current screening practices when misinformation circulates in languages other 
than English,233 non-English speaking countries may stand to gain from cooperating with countries 
where large segments of the population speak the same language, or proximate languages. 
The steps outlined abovealready adopted to some extent in Europe, albeit without a 
specific focus on vaccine misinformation, and with less stringent self-regulatory standards than 
the ones proposed heredo not require the commitment of extensive infrastructure or monetary 
commitments. At a time when the programmatic role of vaccination in popular discourse has 
changed dramatically, the adoption of more stringent self-regulatory frameworks likely faces 
fewer political economy constraints than ever before. Moreover, the development of stronger 
monitoring and cooperation frameworks designed to address this particular sub-set of 
misinformation aligns with public health and consumer protection goals acknowledgedat least 
nominallyby policymakers and regulators in several countries, including the United States.   
The steps proposed here are also admittedly limited. On the one hand, they do not move 
the needle on the need for voluntary industry commitment if the regulation of vaccine 
misinformation is to be harmonized across social mediaand especially when such harmonization 
entails the adoption of more stringent paradigms. On the other hand, they still require 
complementary interventions in other areas, such as the development of more accurate algorithms 
and other screening tools.234 Yet, on balance, they can contribute to the formation of better 
monitoring and response frameworks attuned to the specific problems posed by vaccine 
misinformation; drive the improvement of current best practices; and, at a minimum, exert pressure 
on mainstream social media for the adoption of more homogenous or stringent self-regulatory 
frameworksor, ideally, both. 
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